

Message Text

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (EO/TAGS/SUBJ ADDED)

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E.O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS PARM

SUBJ SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 28, 1973 (SALT TWO -287)

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT

PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, FRIDAY,

SEPTEMBER 28, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 28, 1973

TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO THE TASKS DEFINED BY THE DOCUMENT "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS," AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH EVIDENTLY FOLLOW FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRACTICAL WORK OF THE DELEGATIONS.

THE DOCUMENT SETS DOWN THE UNDERSTANDING THAT "OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT YEAR THE TWO SIDES WILL MAKE SERIOUS EFFORTS TO WORK OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

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WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING IT IN 1974." THIS INDICATES THAT

THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO COMPLETING THE TASK OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHIN A RATHER COMPRESSED PERIOD OF TIME.

YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT AT THE FIRST STAGE (OF SALT) THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF MAY 20, 1971 PROVIDED THAT THE SIDES WOULD CONCENTRATE OVER THE COURSE OF A YEAR ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. THIS UNDERSTANDING FACILITATED INTENSIVE EVOLUTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO NO SMALL DEGREE ENSURED THEIR SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT, CULMINATING IN THE SIGNING ON MAY 26, 1972 OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

THE RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE HIGHEST LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES IN MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973 HAVE LAID A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS WITH RESPECT TO FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND NEGOTIATION FOR THIS PURPOSE OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES IN THIS AREA.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO US, THE FACT THAT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES OF COMMON GOALS AND POSITIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT POSITIVE FACTOR. IN HIS SPEECH AT THE 28TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1973, USSR FOREIGN MINISTER A.A. GROMYKO NOTED: "MOST RECENTLY AN IMPORTANT FRONTIER HAS BEEN CROSSED: AS A RESULT OF THE WELL KNOWN SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS, AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON MUTUAL LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT. IN CONJUNCTION WITH SUCH AN HISTORIC ACT AS CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, THESE UNDERSTANDINGS PROMOTE A MEANINGFUL IMPROVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE."

PARAGRAPH TWO OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS EXPLICITLY RECORDS THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. THAT "NEW AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS ADOPTED IN MOSCOW IN MAY 1972 AND THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN

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WASHINGTON IN JUNE 1973." EVIDENTLY WE MUST CONSTANTLY KEEP THESE DOCUMENTS IN OUR FIELD OF VISION AND, GUIDED BY THEM, WORK OUT THE PROVISIONS OF A DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS IN THE PAST, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IS CALLED UPON TO SERVE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST

BE BUILT. IN MAY 1972 THE USSR AND THE U.S. AGREED THAT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND THAT RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES, BASED ON THE AFOREMENTIONED PRINCIPLE, AND RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE ARE THE NECESSARY PREREQUISITES FOR MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. THE DOCUMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS OF JUNE 21, 1973 ALSO EMPHASIZES THAT "IN PARTICULAR, BOTH SIDES WILL BE GUIDED BY THE RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND BY THE RECOGNITION THAT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, WOULD BE INCONSISTENT

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WITH THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA."

CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE DEMANDS THAT IN RESOLVING THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BE CONSIDERED IN ALL ITS TOTALITY AND ALL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE IT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED, ALL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION. SUCH ARMS ALSO INCLUDE, IN

ADDITION TO LAND-BASED ICBMS, SLBMS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, ANY TYPES OF MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND ANY TYPES OF NUCLEAR DELIVER AIRCRAFT, WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS CARRIER-BASED DELIVERY AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT OF ATTACK CARRIERS.

IN ADDITION, THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR BASES OF ONE OF THE SIDES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES, AS WELL AS THE PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES, MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

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PRECISELY SUCH AN APPROACH REPRESENTS A RATIONAL AND PRACTICABLE BASIS, WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE STATE OF AFFAIRS, FOR SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

CONVERSELY, ATTEMPTS TO SINGLE OUT FROM THE TOTALITY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ONLY SOME PORTION THEREOF, AND TO IGNORE OTHER SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF NUCLEAR STRIKES ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OF THE SIDES AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WOULD IN POINT OF FACT BE A DEVIATION FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. UNDER SUCH AN APPROACH ONE OF THE SIDES COULD OBTAIN DIRECT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, BUT THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE MENTIONED ABOVE.

THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER WOULD IN NO WAY CHANGE IF PROPOSALS AIMED AT PROVIDING SUCH ADVANTAGES WERE TO BE GIVEN THE APPEARANCE OF INCLUDING OSTENSIBLY CONCRETE OR DETAILED VALUES. NO MATTER HOW MANY SUCH DETAILS MIGHT BE ADDED, IF IN THE PROCESS A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE WERE LEFT ASIDE, SUCH PROPOSALS, IF EXAMINED IMPARTIALLY AND OBJECTIVELY, COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES.

STUDIES CONDUCTED DURING THE RECESS HAVE MANIFESTLY SHOWN THAT DIVISION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS INTO "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL" AND ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY BY SUCH A DIVISION PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING ONLY "CENTAL" STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, ARE IN CONFLICT WITH WITH PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. SUCH A CONCEPT DOES NOT REFLECT THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AND IS THEREFORE UNACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AFTER STUDYING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE US DELEGATION AT THE SEPTEMBER 25 MEETING, WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THAT YOU

HAVE EXPRESSED READINESS TO EXERT EFFORTS TO TRANSFORM THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, INTO CONCRETE PROVISIONS. IN OUR CONVERSATION AFTER THE LAST MEETING WE ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR GOOD AND TIGHT ORGANIZATION OF OUR WORK AND FOR USE OF APPROPRIATE FORMATS. THE FACT THAT BOTH
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DELEGATIONS UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TASKS BEFORE US IS NOT A BAD OMEN. INDEED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ORGANIZE OUR WORK IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID DELAYS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE QUITE A LOT OF TIME AVAILABLE TO US NOT GIVE RISE TO THE ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP OUR WORK SLOWLY.

UNDOUBTEDLY THE RECORD OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS COULD ALSO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THE DELEGATIONS. THE SIDES HAVE ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE EACH OTHER'S POSITION ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES MORE PRECISELY. TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE RESULTS OF PAST MEETINGS OF THE DELEGATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, SHOULD HELP US IN OUR SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE ENSURED THROUGH AN ATTENTIVE AND THOUGHTFUL APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH BY THE OTHER SIDE. THIS WOULD BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISION RECORDED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE US THAT THE SIDES WILL CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN A SPIRIT OF RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL ACCOMODATION.
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